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THE ROLE OF NUISANCE IN THE 
DEVELOPING COMMON LAW OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
Kaoru Suzuki* 
Abstract: In 2012, the oil and gas industry created more than 1.2 million 
jobs. The industry expects this number to increase to more than 2.3 mil-
lion in 2035 and expects revenues to exceed $1.9 trillion from 2012 to 
2035. The development of hydraulic fracturing technology, a process by 
which natural gas under shale formations can be extracted, has allowed 
the oil and gas industry to experience this exponential growth. The eco-
nomic benefits of hydraulic fracturing comes at a cost. Residents of Penn-
sylvania, Texas, and Ohio, among other states, have begun to experience 
the environmental harms and effects of hydraulic fracturing. In the wake 
of this technological development, citizens affected by hydraulic fractur-
ing have begun to remedy their situations through the common law.  This 
Note argues that common law nuisance provides a flexible alternative to 
other common law causes of action and distinguishes successful nuisance 
claims from unsuccessful ones. 
Introduction 
 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection faced 
major opposition from residents and environmental groups on January 
22, 2013 after it cancelled a meeting sought by environmental groups 
and citizens concerned about inadequate water testing in Pennsylva-
nia.1 The meeting was scheduled to convene two days later.2 The citi-
zens and environmental organizations sought the meeting after hear-
ing the technical director of the Bureau of Laboratories testify that 
drinking water test results from a hydraulic fracturing site were inade-
quately reported.3 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2013–
2014. 
1 Jon Hurdle, A Clash in Pennsylvania over Fracking and Water Tests, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4 2013, 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/a-clash-in-pennsylvania-over-fracking-and-water- 
tests, available at http://www.perma.cc/0qoWgnm9tLE. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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 Pennsylvania residents, after filing a lawsuit against the hydraulic 
fracturing company that was drilling near their land, delivered drinking 
water samples to a local testing center.4 These residents claimed that 
hydraulic fracturing chemicals contaminated the water and caused 
them to suffer from nausea, breathing difficulties, bone pain, and other 
health problems.5 Similar cases related to hydraulic fracturing have 
arisen across Pennsylvania.6 Many Pennsylvania citizens consequently 
live in fear that a leak in storage facilities, a truck spill, or run–offs from 
hydraulic fracturing sites could not only contaminate their drinking 
water but also damage fields relied upon by their livestock.7 
 The implementation of hydraulic fracturing technology has been 
controversial across the United States.8 Proponents of hydraulic fractur-
ing argue that the United States should use the technology to stimulate 
the sagging economy.9 Other supporters predict that the exploration 
and extraction of natural gas and oil will lead to energy independ-
ence.10 Critics of hydraulic fracturing, however, opine that the wide-
spread use of the technology will have serious environmental conse-
quences and will harm humans and wildlife.11 Environmentalists 
oppose hydraulic fracturing and claim that it diminishes the availability 
of clean water and contaminates the surrounding air.12 
 This Note delineates how citizens seeking legal redress for damages 
incurred by hydraulic fracturing must navigate murky legal territory 
mired with federal statutory loopholes and inadequate state regula-
tion.13 Accordingly, this Note advocates for the use of nuisance lawsuits 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. Investigators had only reported eight out of twenty-four metals found in the resi-
dents’ drinking water. Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 476, 480–81 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Ber-
ish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Fiorentino v. Cabot 
Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 508 (M.D. Pa. 2010). 
7 See Seamus McGraw, Drilling Down on the Family Farm, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2011, at 
SR9. 
8 See Charles Davis, The Politics of “Fracking”: Regulating Natural Gas Drilling Practices in 
Colorado and Texas, 29 Rev. of Pol’y Res. 177, 180 (2012). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo on Gas Drilling Prompts Both Anger and Praise, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 1, 2012, at A1; Learn More About Threatened and Endangered Species, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/espp/coloring/especies.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.perma.cc/0Uyf8kBqcyN. 
12 See Berish, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 706–07; Davis, supra note 8, at 180–81. 
13 See infra notes 68–117 and accompanying text. 
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as a plausible solution.14 Part I of this Note introduces the process of 
hydraulic fracturing and the attendant debate between politicians, citi-
zens, and economists.15 Part II describes current federal and state regu-
lation of hydraulic fracturing.16 Part III examines the common law nui-
sance cause of action.17 Finally, Part IV identifies the inadequacies of 
federal and state regulation, advocates nuisance law as a viable alterna-
tive, and distinguishes successful nuisance claims from unsuccessful 
ones.18 
I. The Geological, Economic, and Political Landscape of 
Hydraulic Fracturing 
A. The Process of Hydraulic Fracturing 
 Gas and oil drilling companies use a process called hydraulic frac-
turing—commonly known as “fracing,” “fracking,” or “hydrofracking” — 
to extract oil and gas reserves trapped under shale formations.19 Com-
panies have been using fracing to extract minerals for more than fifty 
years.20 Recent advances in fracing technology, however, have enabled 
companies to extract previously unreachable natural gas reserves from 
underground shale formations.21 Some refer to this process as “slickwa-
ter” fracturing.22 
 The typical slickwater fracturing process has four stages.23 Contra-
ry to popular belief, fracing is not the initial process of drilling a gas 
                                                                                                                      
14 See David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 685, 686 (2011); Hannah Coman, Note, Balancing the Need for Energy and Clean Water: 
The Case for Applying Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing Suits, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
131, 137–42 (2012); infra notes 68–117 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 19–71 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 72–118 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 119–192 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 193–281 and accompanying text. 
19 Hannah Wiseman, Beyond Coastal Oil v. Garza: Nuisance and Trespass in Hydraulic Frac-
turing Litigation, 57 Advocate 8, 8 (2011). 
20 See id.; Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008); 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking 
Water by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs app. A-1 (2004). 
21 Wiseman, supra note 19, at 8. 
22 Id. 
23 Andrea Ramudo & Sean Murphy, Hydraulic Fracturing—Effects on Water 
Quality 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.cce.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/Natural 
GasDev/Documents/City%20and%20Regional%20Planning%20Student%20Papers/CRP 
5072_Water%20Quality%20Final%20Report.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0WzfV8u3xW; 
Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FracFocus Chemical Disclosure Registry, http://frac 
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well.24 The first stage of fracing begins after a gas company has drilled, 
cased, and cemented an L-shaped wellbore along a shale formation.25 
This initial stage, referred to as the acid stage, uses a small amount of 
water mixed with 15% hydrochloric acid to clear openings in the casing 
and dissolve impurities.26 During the second stage, called the pad stage, 
the gas company injects large volumes of fracing fluid into the wellbore 
under high pressure, which creates fractures along the shale that allow 
natural gas to seep out.27 The third stage, or the prop sequence stage, 
uses propping agents to hold open the fractures created along the 
shale.28 Finally, the fourth stage clears excess proppant from the well-
bore.29 Once the first section of the well has been fraced using this 
method, the area is plugged before the process is repeated30 four to 
twenty times on each section of the well.31 
 Once all the sections of the well are fraced, the plugs are drilled 
out.32 This causes pressurized natural gas to surge up the well.33 The 
initial surge spews out large amounts of fracing fluid and additives.34 
This “flowback water” or “produced water” is collected and transferred 
to steel tanks or trucks for storage or transport.35 Roughly twenty to for-
ty percent of the injected fluids flow back to the surface while the rest 
remain underground.36 Ninety-eight percent of the substance injected 
during slickwater fracturing is comprised of water and propping agents, 
                                                                                                                      
focus.org/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process (last visited Nov. 6, 
2013), available at http://www.perma.cc/0YfdQ8G9Gqr [hereinafter The Process]. 
24 The Process, supra note 23. 
25 Wiseman, supra note 19, at 8; The Process, supra note 23. 
26 Ramudo & Murphy, supra note 23, at 7; The Process, supra note 23. 
27 Wiseman, supra note 19, at 8; The Process, supra note 23. 
28 The Process, supra note 23. 
29 Id. 
30 Ramudo & Murphy, supra note 23, at 8. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 8–9. 
33 Id. at 9. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. It was once common practice for companies to store the flowback or produced 
water temporarily in lined lagoons or storage ponds, but due to an uptick in the number 
of incidents involving seepage into ground water and liners breaking, most companies 
avoid this option by transporting the wastewater to a deep injection well, wastewater treat-
ment plant, or privately owned and operated recycling facility. Id. 
36 Barry Stevens, The Facts About Fracking Fluid and Its Disposal, Oilprice.com (May 23, 
2012), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Facts-about-Fracking-Fluid-and-its-
Disposal.html, available at http://www.perma.cc/05Jqzdyt79o; Abraham Lustgarten, In New 
Gas Wells, More Drilling Chemicals Remain Underground, ProPublica (Dec. 27, 2009), http:// 
www.propublica.org/article/new-gas-wells-leave-more-chemicals-in-ground-hydraulic-fracturing, 
available at http://www.perma.cc/0cLhKKV8DDb. 
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or proppants.37 The proppants are typically not harmful to the envi-
ronment.38 The remaining two percent of the injected fluid consists of 
a myriad of chemical additives.39 These chemicals are added to change 
the properties of the injected water, such as its viscosity, oxygen con-
tent, and density.40 
 Although potentially harmful chemicals in the injected fluids 
comprise only two percent of the mixture, the volume of chemicals that 
are introduced into the environment can nevertheless be staggering.41 
Typically, the fracing process requires two million to eight million gal-
lons of fracing fluid, which means that between 40,000 and 160,000 gal-
lons of chemical additives can be released into the environment at each 
well.42 Furthermore, an estimated 11,400 new wells are fractured each 
year.43 This adds up to 440 million to 1.6 billion gallons of chemicals 
released into the environment each year within the United States, only 
twenty to forty percent of which are recovered from flowback water.44 
                                                                                                                      
37 Chesapeake Energy, Hydraulic Fracturing: Fact Sheet 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.chk.com/Media/Educational-Library/Fact-Sheets/Corporate/Hydraulic_Frac 
turing_Fact_Sheet.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0RFE5F83kL2. Proppants, usually sand 
or other granular substances, which are not harmful to the environment, prop open the 
fractures created by the water and fracing fluids to allow the gas to escape. Id. 
38 See id. 
39 Id.; What Chemicals Are Used, FracFocus Chemical Disclosure Registry, http:// 
fracfocus.org/chemical-use/what-chemicals-are-used (last visited Nov. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.perma.cc/0jV1dUhcTFF. Typical additives include hydrochloric acid, biocides, 
breaker chemicals, clay stabilizers, corrosion inhibitors, crosslinkers, friction reducers, 
gelling agents, iron controllers, pH adjusting agents, scale inhibitors, and surfactants, but 
the precise composition of additives varies from site to site and depends on fracing re-
quirements. What Chemicals Are Used, supra; see Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of 
Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 Fordham 
Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 120 (2009). 
40 Ramudo & Murphy, supra note 23, at 8. 
41 Rachel Ehrenberg, The Facts Behind the Frack, Sci. News (Aug. 24, 2012), https:// 
www.sciencenews.org/article/facts-behind-frack, available at http://perma.cc/05SRzjTpbBi; 
The Process, supra note 23. 
42 See Chesapeake Energy, supra note 37, at 2; Ehrenberg, supra note 41; What Chemi-
cals Are Used, supra note 39. 
43 See Chesapeake Energy, supra note 37, at 2; Ehrenberg, supra note 41; What Chemi-
cals Are Used, supra note 39. 
44 See Chesapeake Energy, supra note 37, at 2; Ehrenberg, supra note 41; What Chemi-
cals Are Used, supra note 39. 
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B. Economic and Political Incentives for Fracing 
 Slickwater fracturing technology significantly lowers the cost of 
extracting gas from difficult-to-reach shale formations.45 Consequently, 
the technology has contributed significantly to stimulate the economy 
across the United States.46 The unconventional oil and natural gas in-
dustry created more than 1.2 million jobs in 2012, a number that is es-
timated to exceed 2.3 million in 2035.47 Government revenues from 
unconventional natural gas activity are expected to exceed $1.9 trillion 
from 2012 through 2035.48 
 Access to large natural gas deposits within United States borders 
also promotes energy independence, which is important considering 
increased turmoil the Middle East.49 Furthermore, catastrophic events 
such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear meltdown have increased awareness of the need for energy in-
dependence.50 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 demonstrates that such factors have 
led to political support for exploration, drilling, and fracing for natural 
gas.51 Weighing these political and economic incentives against envi-
ronmental concerns has been a central issue on state and federal lev-
els.52 On the federal level, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 has demon-
strated congressional support for the fracing industry by creating 
loopholes in federal environmental statutes for the oil and gas indus-
try.53 On the state level, some states have opted to forbid fracing activity, 
                                                                                                                      
45 See BjØrn Lomborg, A Fracking Good Story, Slate (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/health_and_science/project_syndicate/2012/09/thanks_to_fracking_u_s_ 
carbon_emissions_are_at_the_lowest_levels_in_20_years_html, available at http://www.perma. 
cc/0586MJs5ZNk; Wiseman, supra note 19, at 8. 
46 See Info. Handling Serv., America’s New Energy Future: The Unconventional 
Oil and Gas Revolution and the US Economy, at vii (2012) [hereinafter IHS]. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 3 
49 See Davis, supra note 8, at 179. 
50 See id. 
51 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4 (2006); IHS, supra note 46, at 3. 
52 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4; IHS, supra note 46, at 3; Coman, supra 
note 14, at 139. Charles Davis, a professor at Colorado State University, has observed that 
policy makers debate the economic significance of hydraulic fracturing, including the 
boost to the economy, as well as the advantage gained by energy independence, against the 
environmental impact of the activity. See Davis, supra note 8, at 179–81. 
53 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4; Davis, supra note 8, at 178–81; Coman, 
supra note 14, at 137–42. The “Halliburton Loophole” of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
carves out an exception for the fracing industry in the Safe Drinking Water Act and the 
Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4. 
2014] Nuisance Claims and Hydraulic Fracturing 271 
whereas other states have actively encouraged it.54 On the municipal 
level, concerned citizens have provided significant political pressure to 
enact municipal bans on fracing.55 Some experts contend, however, 
that local bills will most likely face challenges from state governments 
asserting that the power to regulate fracing is vested solely within the 
state, rather than local municipalities.56 
C. Environmental Effects of Fracing 
 Although the EPA deemed the environmental and health effects of 
hydraulic fracturing as insignificant in 2004,57 the EPA reopened its 
investigation in 2011.58 Some critics, however, have questioned the in-
tegrity of this renewed study and claimed that the gas industry heavily 
influences the EPA’s investigatory methods.59 
 Numerous complaints from citizens near hydraulic fracturing 
wells, who alleged that methane gas and fracing fluid additives had con-
taminated their drinking water, spurred the EPA to reinvestigate.60 For 
example, citizens in the Marcellus Shale region, which spans Pennsyl-
vania and upstate New York, have raised numerous concerns about the 
                                                                                                                      
54 Jack Healy, With Ban on Drilling Practice, Town Lands in Thick of Dispute, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 26, 2012, at A14; Vermont Fracking Ban: Green Mountain State Is First in U.S. to Restrict Gas 
Drilling Technique, Huffington Post (May 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/05/17/vermont-fracking-ban-first_n_1522098.html, available at http://www.perma.cc/ 
0ZN15ug3g1u [hereinafter Green Mountain State]; Vermont Bans Fracking, Vermont Public 
Interest Research Group (May 4, 2012), http://www.vpirg.org/news/2471, available at 
http://www.perma.cc/0RuuW342zbr. In 2012, the Vermont legislature voted 103–36 to 
ban hydraulic fracturing in the state. Green Mountain State, supra. The bill also requires revi-
sions to the state’s regulations to prohibit injection well operators from accepting out of 
state waste water resulting from oil and natural gas drilling. Green Mountain State, supra. In 
contrast, in Colorado, some believe the state could challenge a municipality’s ban on frac-
ing and claimed that the power belongs only to the state. See Healy, supra, at A14. 
55 See Green Mountain State, supra note 54. 
56 See Healy, supra note 54, at A14; Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo Moving 
to End a Freeze on Gas Drilling, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2011, at A1. 
57 Wiseman, supra note 39, at 128. 
58 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Study of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Frac-
turing on Drinking Water Resources: Progress Report 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2004 Re-
port], available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/hf-report2012 
1214.pdf and http://perma.cc/0s5ACuFNAvu. 
59 Ian Urbina, Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drilling for Gas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2011, at 
A1. Documents show that the EPA has dropped some plans to monitor radioactivity in 
drilling wastewater and that there is pressure from industry lobbyists to narrow the scope 
of the study. Id. Internal e-mails show that EPA agents fear how the public will react if they 
learned of the narrowing scope of the study. Id. 
60 See 2004 Report, supra note 58, at 5; Davis, supra note 8, at 180. 
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safety of drinking water from their underground water supply.61 Docu-
mentaries show tap-water discoloration, the emission of unnatural 
odors, and even flammable tap water in affected regions.62 
 If fracing contaminates underground drinking water, the process 
could have severe detrimental impacts on surrounding ecosystems.63 
Contaminated water could degrade the water supply for countless or-
ganisms, including the surrounding vegetation and animals.64 Some 
experts posit that contamination is caused by faulty casings near under-
ground aquifers, intersections of old wells with new wells, seepage from 
fissures in the shale formation, or flowback water seeping back into the 
ground.65 Such contamination affects both present and future property 
owners.66 Although long-term health studies are generally unavailable 
because fracing is relatively new, exposure to contamination from frac-
ing might have negative long-term effects on humans.67 
 In addition to chemical additives within fracing fluid, flowback wa-
ter also causes contamination because it contains dangerous chemicals, 
including alarming amounts of salt, mercury, arsenic, and other heavy 
metals.68 During storage, flowback water can release fumes or overflow, 
which can cause drinking water contamination, chemical cloud for-
mation, or other hazardous consequences.69 Lastly, the operation of 
natural gas wells leads to air pollution.70 Blowouts, gas leaks, truck ex-
haust from fracing fluid transportation, or emissions from flowback wa-
ter can all contaminate the surrounding air.71 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Keith B. Hall & Lauren E. Godshall, Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 57 ADVOCATE 
13, 13 (2011); Coman, supra note 14, at 142. 
62 FrackNation (Ann and Phelim Media 2013); Gasland (New Video Group Jan. 24, 
2010). 
63 See Davis, supra note 8, at 180. 
64 See id.; Ehrenberg, supra note 41. 
65 See Ehrenberg, supra note 41. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. Chemicals from fracing could cause health complications in humans (such as 
nausea, bone pain, and stomach disorders) but could also cause damage to the surround-
ing ecosystem because studies have found that groundwater in fracing areas has methane 
concentrations as high as seventeen times that of unaffected areas. See Roth, 919 F. Supp. 
2d at 480–81; Berish, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 704; Fiorentino, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
68 See Ehrenberg, supra note 41. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. Furthermore, hydraulic fracturing has a potential to cause minor earthquakes. 
Id. This effect is rare, however, and can be avoided through monitoring. Id. 
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II. Federal and State Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing 
A. Federal Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing: How the Halliburton Loophole 
Leaves Waters Unprotected 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“Act”) provides the fracing indus-
try with certain exemptions from the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
and the Clean Water Act (CWA).72 The Act’s primary objective is to en-
sure the creation and maintenance of jobs in the United States.73 To 
this end, Congress used the Act to insert certain exceptions within fed-
eral environmental statutes for the gas and oil industry.74 These excep-
tions came to be known collectively as the Halliburton Loophole.75 
1. The Safe Drinking Water Act Exemption 
 The SDWA, enacted in 1974, protects the quality of drinking water 
throughout the United States.76 The SDWA requires the regulation of 
all underground injections through the Underground Injection Con-
trol (UIC) program.77 If an underground injection falls within the UIC 
program’s reach, the injecting entity must acquire a permit by demon-
strating that the underground injection will not endanger drinking wa-
ter sources.78 If examined solely under the SDWA’s UIC program, the 
injection of fracing fluid would be considered an underground injec-
tion that requires a permit.79 The Act, however, has conclusively fore-
closed this possibility.80 The Act essentially codifies the EPA’s 2004 find-
                                                                                                                      
72 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4 (2006). 
73 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). The pream-
ble states that the Act was enacted “to ensure jobs for our future with secure, affordable, 
and reliable energy.” Id. 
74 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4. 
75 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4; Coman, supra note 14, at 139. 
76 Earthworks & Oil and Gas Accountability Project, The Oil and Gas Indus-
try’s Exclusions and Exemptions to Major Environmental Statutes 8 (2007) [here-
inafter OGAP Report]. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A) (2006); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir. 1997). 
78 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1474. 
79 Id. 
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4. First, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 stated that fracing opera-
tions were completely exempt from regulation under the SDWA. Id.; OGAP Report, supra 
note 76, at 8. Second, the Act called for voluntary discontinuance of diesel fuels in fracing 
operation. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4; OGAP Report, supra note 76, at 8. Finally, the Act released 
the EPA from obligations to regulate threats to drinking water from fracing fluids even 
when gas producers use diesel fuels in their fracing operations. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4; OGAP 
Report, supra note 76, at 8. The result allows the fracing industry to operate oil and gas 
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ing that the environmental effects of fracing were insignificant, and 
thus exempts the fracing industry from having to obtain UIC permits 
before beginning fracing activity.81 
 In 2009, Democratic members of Congress sought to close the Hal-
liburton Loophole82 through the proposed Fracturing Responsibility 
and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act),83 which would have re-
quired the oil and gas industry to disclose chemicals used in drilling 
projects.84 Although the FRAC Act was introduced to Congress in 2009 
and again in 2011, both efforts were unsuccessful.85 
2. Clean Water Act Exemption 
 The CWA regulates the quality of surface waters in the United 
States.86 It achieves this goal by making it unlawful to discharge any pol-
lutant from a point source into navigable waters without a permit.87 In 
addition to point sources, the CWA also imposes restrictions on non-
point sources such as stormwater runoffs.88 
 The CWA exempts the oil, gas, and mining industry from the 
stormwater permit program as long as the runoff is not contaminated 
by contact with raw materials or waste.89 The EPA attempted to revise its 
CWA regulations to limit stormwater runoffs from fracing well sites, 
once in 1990 and again in 1999, by asserting that large amounts of sed-
iment discharged into surface waters constitutes a pollutant.90 The 
1990 and 1999 EPA regulations would have required permits for site 
operators who were disturbing one to five acres of land through sedi-
ment discharges.91 
                                                                                                                      
wells without complying with SDWA requirements that ensure the safety of drinking water. 
42 U.S.C. § 300h-4; OGAP Report, supra note 76, at 8. 
81 See 2004 Report, supra note 58, at 128; Wiseman, supra note 39, at 128. 
82 Coman, supra note 14, at 139. 
83 Id. 
84 Senators, Representatives Act to Close Halliburton Loophole in the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
Earthworks ( June 9, 2009), http://www.earthworksaction.org/media/detail/senators_ 
representatives_act_to_close_halliburton_loophole_in_the_safe_drin#.UPMar280WSo, avail-
able at http://www.perma.cc/07CwKP2uGwg. 
85 See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); Fracturing Responsibility Awareness of Chemicals Act of 
2009, H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Coman, supra note 14, at 139. 
86 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
87 Id. § 1342(a)(2). 
88 40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(3)–(4) (2007). 
89 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); OGAP Report, supra note 76, at 10. 
90 OGAP Report, supra note 76, at 10–11. 
91 Id. 
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 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended the CWA to provide that 
sediment is no longer considered a pollutant.92 This exemption applied 
to the construction of drilling sites, drilling waste management pits, 
access roads, in-field treatment plants, and the transportation infra-
structure necessary for the operation of most oil and gas fields.93 Simi-
lar to the SDWA exemption, the CWA exemption allows the fracing in-
dustry to operate without complying with permits that implement 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System standards requiring 
the use of the best available technology to treat pollution outputs.94 
B. State Regulation Attempts 
 Since October 2010, at least nineteen state legislatures have 
passed, or at least considered, more than one hundred bills relating to 
fracing.95 The most prominent types of state regulation include disclo-
sure requirement statutes, permitting statutes, and moratorium stat-
utes.96 Although most oil producing states have some sort of regulatory 
framework, state regulators’ competence with respect to inspection and 
monitoring of wells has come under scrutiny.97 
1. Disclosure and Permitting Statutes 
 In September 2010, Wyoming became the first state to require full 
disclosure of fracing fluid chemicals as a condition to obtaining a frac-
ing permit.98 Michigan and Texas soon followed Wyoming’s lead.99 Dis-
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. The EPA has confirmed that this exemption applies to all oil and gas field 
construction activities by stating that “all covered oil and gas-related construction activities 
are eligible for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting exemption 
for their uncontaminated stormwater discharges without regard to the amount of acreage 
disturbed.” Id. 
93 Id. at 11. 
94 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4. 
95 Jacquelyn Pless, Fracking Update: What States are Doing to Ensure Safe Natural Gas Extraction, 
Nat’l Conf. of State Leg. ( July 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/energyhome/ 
fracking-update-what-states-are-doing.aspx, available at http://www.perma.cc/0JBeFacnADR. 
96 See id.; 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 732/1–75 (LexisNexis 2013); 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 3222.1 (LexisNexis 2013) (approved Feb. 14, 2012, effective in 60 days thereafter); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 571 (LexisNexis 2013) (effective May 16, 2012). 
97 See Earthworks, Breaking All the Rules: The Crisis in Oil & Gas Regulatory 
Enforcement 8 (2012) [hereinafter Inspection Report]. 
98 Pless, supra note 95. 
99 Id. 
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closure statutes vary in complexity by state.100 Presently, around four-
teen states, including Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming,101 require full 
disclosure of all chemicals.102 Other states such as Virginia, Tennessee, 
and Maryland103 have permit systems that might or might not require 
complete disclosure.104 These disclosure statutes appeal to the public 
because they require transparency by the gas industry.105 
2. Moratorium Statutes 
 In 2012, Vermont’s governor, Peter Shumlin, signed into law the 
nation’s first ban on fracing activity.106 Shumlin said that other states 
should emulate Vermont’s ban and pass similar legislation because clean 
drinking water will become “more valuable than oil or natural gas.”107 In 
contrast, New York’s governor, Andrew Cuomo, lifted a moratorium on 
fracing in 2011 by allowing such activity on private lands.108 The New 
York State Senate praised the move because of the economic boost that 
the gas industry would bring to upstate New York.109 
 Maryland unsuccessfully tried to regulate fracing by prohibiting 
the process unless certain conditions were met.110 The failed bill would 
have required well operators to demonstrate that their drilling and well 
operation would not impair the sustainability, water quality, or potabil-
ity of ground and surface water.111 The bill would have also required 
fracing fluid to contain only approved chemical additives.112 
                                                                                                                      
100 See Brad Plumer, How States Are Regulating Fracking (in Maps), Wash. Post, July 16, 
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/16/how-states-are-reg 
ulating-fracking-in-maps, available at http://www.perma.cc/03hetAH5qdd. 
101 See id. Other states that require full disclosure include Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado. Id. 
102 See id. 
103 Other states that require compliance with specific permits are Indiana, Kentucky, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. Id. 
104 See id. 
105 See Davis, supra note 8, at 180–81. 
106 Green Mountain State, supra note 54. 
107 Id. 
108 Hakim & Confessore, supra note 56, at A1. 
109 Id. at A21. 
110 Pless, supra note 95. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. Maryland’s House Bill 1274 and Senate Bill 601, both addressing a fracking morato-
rium, were defeated by a single vote. All Bills to Ban, Place Moratorium on Fracking Dead, Cum-
berland Times-News (Mar. 7, 2013), http://times-news.com/local/x986706374/All-bills-to-
ban-place-moratorium-on-fracking-dead, available at http://www.perma.cc/0sx6TESBcW6. 
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3. Inspection and Enforcement 
 A recent report by Earthworks, a nonprofit organization dedicated 
to protecting the environment, found that 53% to 91% of wells in stud-
ied states were operating without inspections.113 Even when inspectors 
found rule violations, penalties had no deterring effect on the violators, 
and inspectors often neglected to record the violations formally.114 Ac-
cording to the report, state regulatory agencies failed to increase staff-
ing in response to the surge in oil and natural gas activity, which handi-
capped the agencies’ ability to supervise the growing industry.115 
 Furthermore, in most states citizens lack a statutory right to chal-
lenge companies that fail to comply with state oil and gas rules.116 Con-
sequently, citizens often complain to state regulators about well site vio-
lations, which provides an impetus for eventual inspections.117 State 
regulators’ responses to citizen complaints, however, are rarely initiated 
immediately and tend not to be thorough.118 
III. Nuisance Law in Hydraulic Fracturing Cases 
 Because federal and state regulation of fracing is rife with loop-
holes and is accordingly difficult to enforce, citizens affected by fracing 
often use common law actions against oil and gas producers rather 
than federal or state statutory causes of action.119 Common law claims 
include trespass, negligence, strict liability, and private and public nui-
sance.120 
A. Overview of Common Law Nuisance 
 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a private nuisance is a 
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and en-
joyment of land.121 The interests contemplated include not only the 
interests that a person might have in the current uses of the land— res-
idential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, etc.—but also interests in 
                                                                                                                      
113 Inspection Report, supra note 97, at 8. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 9. 
116 Id. at 14. 
117 See id. at 10. 
118 See id. 
119 See Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Fioren-
tino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 508 (M.D. Pa. 2010). 
120 See Berish, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 704; Fiorentino, F. Supp. 2d at 508; Coastal Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11–12 (Tex. 2008). 
121 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1979). 
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the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment of the land.122 Nuisance covers a 
broad spectrum of interests and allows plaintiffs to claim numerous 
types of invasions.123 
 An entity is liable for private nuisance if “his conduct is a legal 
cause of an invasion . . . , and the invasion is either (a) intentional and 
unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the 
rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for ab-
normally dangerous conditions or activities.”124 Thus, an entity can be 
liable for nuisance by acting intentionally and unreasonably, negligently 
or recklessly, or by engaging in abnormally dangerous activities.125 
 An actor acts intentionally by acting “for the purpose of causing, or 
knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result in an inva-
sion of another’s property interest.”126 The knowledge that the actor 
possesses at the time that he acts or fails to act separates intentional in-
vasions from unintentional invasions.127 An actor who knowingly causes 
an invasion in the pursuit of a laudable enterprise, without any desire 
to cause harm, can still act intentionally.128 Intentional invasions must 
also be unreasonable.129 An invasion is unreasonable if the gravity of 
the harm is greater than the value of the actor’s conduct, or if the harm 
or financial burden would make the continuation of the conduct un-
feasible.130 
 Unintentional invasions must be negligent, reckless, or caused by 
abnormally dangerous activity.131 The rules for determining negligence 
and recklessness for unintentional nuisances parallel those governing 
negligence and recklessness for other harms.132 In nuisance, an actor’s 
conduct must involve an unreasonable risk of harm to a person’s ability 
to enjoy his or her land.133 In determining the unreasonable character 
                                                                                                                      
122 Id. § 821D cmt. b; see Bader v. Iowa Metro. Sewer Co., 178 N.W.2d 305, 305 (Iowa 
1970). 
123 See Bader, 178 N.W.2d at 305; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D cmt. b. 
124 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822. 
125 Id. § 822 cmt. a. 
126 Id. § 825; see McQuilken v. A & R Dev. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); Diess v. Pa. Dept. of Transp., 935 A.2d 895, 906 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). 
127 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 825; see McQuilken, 576 F. Supp. at 1030; Diess, 
935 A.2d at 906. 
128 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 825 cmt. c. 
129 Id. § 822. 
130 Id. § 826. 
131 Id. § 822. 
132 See id. § 822 cmt. i. 
133 Id. § 822 cmt. k. 
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of this risk, the law attaches value to the specific interest imperiled.134 
Furthermore, the risk must outweigh the utility of the actor’s con-
duct.135 The actor’s conduct might have sufficient utility to outweigh a 
certain amount of risk to another’s use and enjoyment of land, but 
might not have sufficient utility to outweigh the risk of bodily harm.136 
Courts have generally concluded that storage and transmission of gas 
and petroleum products are not abnormally dangerous activities, but a 
general consensus about the dangerousness of fracing has not been 
reached.137 
 In both private and public nuisance, liability can exist only if the 
activity causes significant harm of a kind that would be suffered by a 
normal person in the community or by property in normal condition 
and used for normal purposes.138 Significant harm means harm involv-
ing more than a slight inconvenience or minor annoyance.139 There 
must be a real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiff’s interests that 
interferes with the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of land.140 For public 
nuisance, the plaintiff must show particular harm, of a kind different 
from that suffered by other members of the public.141 
                                                                                                                      
134 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 cmt. i. Several factors are considered: 
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of determining 
whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are important: (a) the so-
cial value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled; (b) the extent 
of the chance that the actor’s conduct will cause an invasion of any interest of 
the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member; (c) the extent 
of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled; (d) the number of 
persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect in 
harm. 
Id. § 293 (emphasis added). 
135 See id. § 822 cmt. k. 
136 Id. § 822 cmt. i. Similarly, a person is liable for public nuisance when he or she unrea-
sonably interferes with the public’s right to enjoy property. Id. § 821B. Furthermore, public 
nuisance also includes conduct that has a potential to produce a permanent or long-lasting 
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public 
right. Id. 
137 E.g., Berish, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 705; Diffenderfer v. Staner, 722 A.2d 1103, 1108–09 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); see Blake 
Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing Primer 10 (2013). 
138 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F; see McQuilken, 576 F. Supp. at 1030; 
O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
139 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F cmt. c; see O’Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 658; 
McQuilken, 576 F. Supp. at 1030. 
140 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F cmt. c; see O’Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 658; 
McQuilken, 576 F. Supp. at 1030. 
141 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F cmt. c; see O’Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 658; 
McQuilken, 576 F. Supp. at 1030. 
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 The term “normal” seeks to impose an objective standard when 
measuring the significance of harm.142 When an invasion involves a 
detrimental change in a person’s enjoyment of land, the standard for 
determining significant harm is the standard of normal people or 
property in the particular locality.143 Thus, if the harm is not objectively 
significant to a normal person, a hypersensitive person that personally 
experiences harm that seems significant to him or her cannot success-
fully bring a private nuisance claim.144 Similarly, courts must consider 
the location, character, and habits of the particular community when 
determining what constitutes offensive or annoying conduct to a nor-
mal person.145 Courts must also consider fears and other mental reac-
tions common to a given community.146 Finally, for a harm to be signif-
icant, the harm usually must be persistent or recur during some period 
of time.147 
B. Distinguishing Negligence and Nuisance 
 The historical development of nuisance led to some confusion be-
tween unintentional nuisances and negligence.148 In early tort law, an 
actor was liable for harm caused by his acts whether that harm was done 
intentionally, negligently, or accidentally.149 As tort law progressed, 
courts began to distinguish between intentional, negligent, and acci-
dental acts and began to find that an actor should not be liable for acci-
dental acts.150 Nuisance, however, remained actionable whether or not 
the actor acted accidentally.151 When nuisance essentially “caught up” to 
other tort causes of action and became actionable only for intentional, 
negligent, reckless or abnormally dangerous acts, the distinction be-
tween negligence and nuisance blurred considerably.152 
 The distinction lies in the type of harm suffered by plaintiffs.153 A 
negligent interference with the use and enjoyment of land is a private 
nuisance as to the interest infringed upon and negligence regarding 
                                                                                                                      
142 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F cmt. d. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. cmt. e. 
146 Id. cmt. f. 
147 Id. cmt. g. 
148 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822. 
149 Id. cmt. b. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. cmt. c. 
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the conduct that causes the invasion.154 A claim for nuisance can theo-
retically be brought by a plaintiff that suffered subjective harm rather 
than actual physical or pecuniary harm.155 
C. Trespass Compared to Nuisance: Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza 
Energy Trust 
 A confusing overlap also exists between trespass and nuisance.156 
Comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggest that the ac-
tionable harms in nuisance claims can be quite subjective.157 By con-
trast, trespass requires an actual physical invasion of property by an un-
welcomed person or thing.158 Furthermore, with nuisance, unlike 
trespass, there is “no general rule of law that one acts at his own peril 
with respect to interference with another’s use or enjoyment of land.”159 
When the interferences are purely accidental, the actor incurs no liabil-
ity.160 
 The maxim “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos” has 
been used to describe the property interests protected by trespass.161 It 
states that a man’s property extends to the heavens above and to the 
core of the earth below.162 More recently, this maxim has been disre-
garded as having no place in the modern world.163 For example, in 1936 
the court in Hinman v. Pacific Air Lines Transport Corp. held that the ad 
coelum doctrine had narrow limits that simply meant that the landowner 
could use the space above his property to the extent that he was able to 
do so.164 Accordingly, the court refused to apply the ad coelum doctrine 
to airspace above the plaintiff’s property used by airplanes.165 
                                                                                                                      
154 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 cmt. c. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. § 821D cmt. e. 
157 See id. Comment e to § 821D of the Restatement states that a nuisance could be cre-
ated by a dog barking in a neighbor’s yard. Id. The harm caused in this scenario is an inva-
sion of the person’s pleasure in enjoying quietness in his or her property. See id. The deci-
bel and frequency of loudness that gives rise to such an invasion most likely depends on a 
case by case analysis. See id. 
158 See id. § 821D. 
159 See id. § 822 cmt. i. 
160 Id. 
161 Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 49 
Washburn L.J. 247, 247 (2010). 
162 See id. 
163 See Pierce, supra note 14, at 685; Anderson, supra note 161, at 253. 
164 84 F.2d 755, 758–59 (9th Cir. 1936); Anderson, supra note 161, at 254. 
165 Hinman, 84 F.2d at 758–59; Anderson, supra note 161, at 254. 
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 In 2010, court in the Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust 
noted that the same narrow limits may apply to the subsurface extension 
of property.166 Although the court did not definitively rule that subsur-
face trespass cannot occur through fracing activities, it nevertheless im-
plied as much.167 The court analogized underground drilling fractures 
far below the surface to airplanes passing two miles above a person’s 
land.168 In addition, the court imposed a “permanent harm” require-
ment as a condition for trespass relief.169 Thus, subsurface physical in-
trusion alone by fracing equipment or fluids might not be enough to 
sustain a trespass action.170 
 Further, forced pooling or compulsory pooling statutes, which re-
quire certain landowners to unitize their property, have eliminated 
many trespass actions.171 These statutes require gas companies to com-
pensate landowners with good faith royalties in exchange for mineral 
leases.172 Trespass actions are therefore unavailable for these landown-
ers because they have leased away subsurface rights to gas companies.173 
D. Nuisance in Hydraulic Fracturing Cases 
 Nuisance causes of action appear sparsely in hydraulic fracturing 
cases.174 In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss and ruled that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a val-
                                                                                                                      
166 268 S.W.3d at 11; Pierce, supra note 14, at 691–92. 
167 See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 11–12; Pierce, supra note 14, at 692. Rather than face 
the issue directly, the Garza court ruled that subsurface invasion by fracing was not an ac-
tionable trespass because the resulting damages were protected by the rule of capture. 
Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 11–12. 
168 See id. at 12. 
169 See id. at 10. 
170 See id. at 10–12. 
171 E.H. Schopler, Validity of Compulsory Pooling or Unitization Statute or 
Ordinance Requiring Owners or Lessees of Oil and Gas Lands to Develop Their 
Holdings as a Single Drilling Unit and the Like, 37 A.L.R.2d 434, § 1 (1954). Land-
owners within the unitization region are essentially forced to lease out their mineral rights 
to the gas producer and accept royalties in exchange. See Ronnie Blackwell, Forced Pooling 
Within the Barnett Shale: How Should the Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act Apply to Units with 
Horizontal Wells?, 17 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 1, 18–19 (2010). 
172 Blackwell, supra note 171, at 18. 
173 See id. 
174 See O’Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 658; Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 476, 
480–81 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., No. 1:11-CV-44-DPM, 2012 WL 528253, 
at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012). 
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id private nuisance claim.175 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 
contaminated their water supply and that the plaintiffs incurred costs 
for water sampling, water quality monitoring, and purchasing alterna-
tive water sources for consumption and residential use.176 The court 
concluded that these potentially ongoing expenses could be deemed 
“seriously annoying or intolerable.”177 In their complaint, the plaintiffs 
described the various chemicals present in fracing fluid, described the 
changes in water quality before and after drilling activity, alleged that 
defective casing caused the contamination, and claimed that the de-
fendants acted either intentionally and unreasonably or negligently.178 
 In Berish v. Southwestern Energy Production Co., a 2012 case involving 
fracing, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
held that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim and refused to grant the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss.179 The court stated in dicta that Pennsylva-
nia recognizes a cause of action for inconvenience and discomfort 
caused by another’s interference with the peaceful possession of real 
estate.180 The court subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to file a third 
amended complaint, and the case ultimately settled.181 The fact that the 
defendants did not challenge the nuisance claims in their motion to 
dismiss suggests that the nuisance cause of action might have possessed 
a strong likelihood of success.182 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that 
the defendant’s negligent conduct caused fracing fluid to be discharged 
into the ground or into the waters near the plaintiffs’ homes.183 
                                                                                                                      
175 Roth, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 480. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
for trespass, inconvenience and discomfort, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 497–
98. 
176 Id. at 484. 
177 Id. at 491. 
178 First Amended Complaint at 4–10, 18, Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 919 F. Supp. 
2d 476 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 3:12-CV-00898-JEJ) [hereinafter Roth Complaint]. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the invasions of their property interests were intentional and unreasona-
ble because the defendants knew that their drilling and operating of the wells was substan-
tially certain to result in the discharge of various substances and hazardous chemicals. Id. 
at 18. 
179 Berish, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 705–07. The court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for emotional distress, but the court refused to grant their motion to dismiss the 
strict liability claim and required the plaintiffs to amend their complaint as to damages for 
inconvenience and discomfort. Id. 
180 Id. at 706; Watson, supra note 137, at 11. 
181 Watson, supra note 137, at 11. 
182 See Wiseman, supra note 19, at 10. 
183 Complaint at Law and in Equity at 8–9, Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 702 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (No. 3:10–CV–01981) [hereinafter Berish Complaint]. 
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 In 2012, the plaintiffs in Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co. also sur-
vived a motion to dismiss on the condition that they amend their com-
plaint.184 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
deduced that the plaintiffs might have had a valid nuisance claim from 
the relevant facts, including contamination of ponds and a water well 
forty feet from the plaintiffs’ property.185 The court went on to state 
that there is no feasible way to prove exactly what happens beneath the 
surface, which suggests that proof of direct causation might not be re-
quired in fracing cases.186 In the complaint, the plaintiffs described the 
fracing wells, listed specific chemicals in fracing fluid, listed specific 
chemicals found in their water supply, matched those chemicals with 
chemicals in fracing fluid, and alleged that the defendant knew or 
should have known that there was no way to control the fracturing pro-
cess.187 
 In contrast, in 1981 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania ruled in O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., that the plain-
tiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a public or private nui-
sance claim.188 The plaintiffs claimed that a neighboring landfill caused 
drinking water contamination, air pollution, and foul odor.189 The 
court reasoned that the reported incidents were too sporadic and in-
significant to sustain a nuisance claim.190 In a similar case, the court in 
Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co. concluded in 1993 that the defendant’s 
past waste dumping activities did not create a nuisance.191 The court 
noted that although the level of toxins found on land did not have to 
reach dangerous levels, the level of pollutants on the other hand must 
rise to a level that would cause significant harm to the public right.192 
                                                                                                                      
184 2012 WL 528253, at *2; see Watson, supra note 137, at 4. 
185 See Tucker, 2012 WL 528253, at *2. 
186 See id. 
187 Second Combined Amended Complaint at 4–11, Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., 2012 
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188 523 F. Supp. at 658. 
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IV. Nuisance: Filling Statutory Gaps 
A. Inadequacies of Federal and State Regulation and the Need to Use  
Common Law Causes of Action 
 The fracing process introduces an astounding amount of chemicals 
into a well’s surroundings.193 Consequently, one might reasonably be-
lieve that these underground injections would be regulated by the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or the Clean Water Act (CWA).194 The 
“Halliburton Loophole” created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Act), 
however, exempts oil and gas companies from the SDWA and CWA’s 
respective mandates.195 A coalition consisting of oil and gas industry 
supporters succeeded in convincing Congress to create the exemp-
tions.196 
 Although the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemi-
cals Act (FRAC Act) would have eliminated the oil and gas industry’s 
exemptions from the SDWA,197 the political climate in the United 
States, dominated by the push for job creation and economic recovery, 
prevented the FRAC Act from being enacted.198 Congress concluded 
that the economic benefits of fracing sufficiently outweighed the det-
rimental environmental effects.199 Thus, for the foreseeable future, the 
Halliburton Loophole will likely remain untouched by legislative ac-
tion.200 Consequently, this leaves states to regulate fracing activity on 
their own through legislation, and citizens to defend their own land by 
means of common law causes of action.201 
 States have attempted to regulate fracing through disclosure and 
permitting statutes, moratorium statutes, and inspection requirements, 
but these regulatory attempts have several shortcomings.202 First, not 
only do state regulators lack the power to enforce disclosure and per-
                                                                                                                      
193 See supra notes 19–44 and accompanying text. 
194 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (2006). 
195 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1), (l); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h(b)(1)(A), 300h-4. 
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197 See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 
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mitting, but  these statutes are also devoid of citizen enforcement provi-
sions.203 Disclosure is only a first step toward full, comprehensive regu-
lation,204 and the lack of citizen enforcement provisions leaves private 
parties without any statutory recourse against oil and gas companies.205 
 Second, although moratorium statutes provide a complete ban on 
fracing activity, most states will be unlikely to enact such statutes.206 The 
economic benefits that fracing brings to states will be irresistible to 
most gas-producing states.207 These statutes might gain popularity, 
however, if fracing’s serious environmental consequences come to 
light.208 Governor Shumlin’s moratorium statute in Vermont exempli-
fies a state’s response to rising concern over fracing activity.209 Unfor-
tunately, the prospect of bringing in billions of dollars in gross state 
product through hydraulic fracturing will likely diminish the popularity 
of similar state moratorium statutes.210 
 Third, state inspection and enforcement measures are inadequate 
even with state regulations in place.211 Inspections occur sporadically 
and do not present a significant incentive for hydraulic fracturing 
companies to monitor their wells thoroughly for leaks or spillage.212 
 The environmental effects of fracing can be mitigated through re-
ducing the fracing “footprint.”213 Media pressure and public awareness 
of potential environmental effects have influenced some gas companies 
to reduce their fracing footprint through “green fracing” programs.214 
Unfortunately, the lack of federal regulation governing fracing and the 
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inadequacy of state regulations leave the hydraulic fracturing industry 
largely unregulated.215 
 Federal and state regulations act as the backbone for preventative 
action against activities that negatively affect the environment.216 With-
out a proper regulatory structure for a potentially threatening activity, 
harmful effects to the environment are likely inevitable.217 Not surpris-
ingly, aggrieved citizens, faced with a seemingly ineffectual regulatory 
structure, have brought common law actions against gas companies and 
well site operators to counteract the lack of regulation.218 
B. Using Nuisance Against Hydraulic Fracturing Activity 
 The law of nuisance with regard to hydraulic fracturing is less de-
veloped than the law of trespass,219 but recent cases have suggested that 
certain common law actions might be easier to pursue in this context 
than others.220 For example, the decision in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Garza Energy Trust suggests that trespass might not be a promising op-
tion for plaintiffs pitted against oil and gas producers in contamination 
cases.221 Nuisance, however, remains a viable option for citizens seeking 
relief against companies that use hydraulic fracturing.222 
 To recover under private nuisance, a plaintiff must show (1) causa-
tion, (2) intentional and unreasonable invasion, or an invasion that was 
unintentional and otherwise actionable under negligence, recklessness, 
or strict liability, and (3) significant harm.223 This section applies the 
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elements of nuisance to fracing activity and discusses why nuisance 
claims fit these cases better than other causes of action.224 
1. Causation 
 In almost all environmental tort cases, the most challenging ele-
ment to prove is causation.225 The costs of scientific research and data 
analysis, coupled with the tenuous connection between drilling activi-
ties and pollution, presents an uphill battle for plaintiffs.226 Because the 
interests protected under nuisance include the pleasure and peace of 
mind associated with the plaintiff’s property, though, proving that frac-
ing operations caused invasions of these interests might be easier com-
pared to proving causation in trespass claims.227 For example, a nui-
sance action might be brought for invasion of a person’s interest in the 
peace of mind derived from having access to uncontaminated drinking 
water.228 The cause of such an invasion could be merely the presence of 
a fracing well near the plaintiff’s property.229 Nuisance applied in this 
context, therefore, might provide a flexible and useful tool for citizens 
concerned about fracing activity occurring around their property.230 
 Furthermore, the court in Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co. implied 
that the standard of proof for determining causation might be relaxed 
in fracing cases.231 The court noted that there is no feasible way to 
prove exactly what happens beneath the surface, which seems to imply 
that plaintiffs do not have to prove the exact cause of groundwater con-
tamination.232 Therefore, plaintiffs can prove causation through drink-
ing water testing or testing of the soil and bodies of water around the 
well site.233 The presence of fracing chemicals in the environment 
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could be enough to prove causation through  inferential reasoning and 
processes of elimination.234 
 For example, in Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs alleged 
that their drinking water did not contain contaminants before the frac-
ing activity started and that fracing fluid agents appeared soon after 
fracing commenced.235 The inference was that the drillers caused the 
contamination because the same chemicals used in the hydraulic frac-
turing were found in the surrounding environment, and there was no 
alternative explanation for their presence.236 Most jurors would not 
have to stretch their imaginations to reach this conclusion.237 Further-
more, courts applying the Tucker standard are likely to refrain from 
forcing plaintiffs to prove the exact cause of contamination, such as 
faulty casings, intersections of old wells with new wells, or seepage from 
fissures in the shale formation.238 
2. Intentional or Unintentional Act 
 Secondly, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the invasion was either 
intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and actionable under 
the rules governing negligence, recklessness, or abnormally dangerous 
activity.239 The actor’s knowledge at the time of the alleged invasion 
determines whether the act constituted an intentional or unintentional 
invasion.240 
 Intentional invasions might be easier to prove than unintentional 
invasions in fracing cases.241 An actor acts intentionally “if he or she acts 
for the purpose of causing an invasion, or knows that their actions are 
resulting or is [sic] substantially certain to result in an invasion of an-
other’s property interest.”242 Thus, at a minimum, the fracing company 
must have knowledge that its actions are resulting in contamination.243 
After the actor knows that his or her conduct resulted in an invasion, 
further invasions are automatically considered intentional.244 A plaintiff 
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in a fracing case merely has to notify the defendant about the alleged 
invasion, or alternatively prove that the defendant had prior knowledge 
of the invasion through past complaints.245 
 In contrast, unintentional invasions require that the risk of inva-
sion and the value of the invaded interest outweigh the utility of the 
action.246 Fracing activity has extremely high social utility because it 
creates jobs, boosts the economy, and promotes energy independ-
ence.247 The risks of drinking water contamination would most likely 
outweigh these socially desirous aspects of fracing, but the analysis 
would likely differ from case to case.248 
 Although both intentional and unintentional invasions could the-
oretically succeed, intentional invasions would perhaps be less burden-
some for plaintiffs to establish because the invasion is presumed to be 
intentional after notification.249 
3. Significant Harm 
 Finally, for a defendant to be liable for nuisance, the defendant 
must have caused significant harm to the plaintiff’s right to enjoy his 
property.250 The law of nuisance protects a wide array of property inter-
ests but does not meddle with trivial annoyances.251 The standard used 
to decide whether an annoyance is significant is that of a normal person 
with normal sensitivities,252 taking into account the surrounding com-
munity’s habits and expectations.253 Many plaintiffs, especially those in 
areas like the outskirts of Pennsylvania, rely on underground sources of 
water for their residences or businesses.254 Because of their reliance on 
underground water, these plaintiffs and their fellow community mem-
bers expect their water supplies to be free of artificial chemicals.255 The 
presence of fracing chemicals in these water supplies would therefore 
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likely constitute a significant annoyance or harm to the property enjoy-
ment of a normal resident within that geographic area.256 
C. Distinguishing Successful Nuisance Complaints from Unsuccessful Attempts 
and Recommendations for Potential Plaintiffs 
 Unfortunately, a lack of case law leaves the application of nuisance 
to fracing largely undeveloped.257 Recent cases, however, provide a 
glimpse of how a plaintiff might effectively file a nuisance claim against 
fracing activity.258 Furthermore, these cases inform citizens living near 
fracing sites about low-cost methods of preparation for possible 
groundwater contamination cases.259 
 In Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs’ complaint described 
the various chemicals present in fracing fluid, described the changes in 
water quality before and after drilling activity (including specific meas-
urements of chemicals in the water), alleged that defective casing 
caused the contamination, and claimed that the defendants acted ei-
ther intentionally and unreasonably or negligently.260 The complaint 
showed causation by specific identifications of changes in water quali-
ty.261 Furthermore, it alleged that defective casings were the specific 
cause of the contamination.262 The plaintiffs alleged that the invasion 
was either intentional or negligent and claimed that the invasion con-
stituted a substantial harm because they were forced to conduct water 
testing, buy replacement water for consumption, and incur healthcare 
costs.263 The court concluded that the costs incurred for water sam-
pling, water quality monitoring, and the purchase of alternative sources 
of potable water were potentially “seriously annoying or intolerable.”264 
The Roth complaint succeeds because it alleges all of the necessary el-
ements with specificity, claims both intentional and unintentional inva-
sions, and produces data on water quality from before and after the 
fracing activity commenced.265 
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 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co. defeated 
a motion to dismiss and ultimately settled.266 The plaintiffs matched 
specific chemicals in fracing fluid with chemicals found in their water 
supply and alleged that the defendant knew, or should have known that 
there was no way to control the fracturing process.267 Proof of causation 
mirrored that in Roth, but unlike Roth, the plaintiffs did not point to 
any part of the fracing process as a specific cause.268 This suggests that 
plaintiffs might not need to allege specific causation to satisfy the cau-
sation requirement of nuisance in fracing cases at least during the pre-
discovery phase.269 
 Unlike Roth and Tucker, where the plaintiffs alleged both an inten-
tional and unintentional invasion, the plaintiffs in Berish v. Southwestern 
Energy Production Co. only alleged that the defendant unintentionally 
invaded their property.270 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 
negligently caused releases, spills, and discharges of harmful substances 
into the plaintiffs’ water supply.271 The complaint stated that the con-
tamination of underground water caused serious annoyance or discom-
fort given the plaintiffs’ daily reliance on groundwater wells.272 The 
plaintiffs did not present details such as the type of chemicals intro-
duced by fracing fluid, or the process of fracing, but did mention costs 
for water samples and alternative water.273 
 In O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc. and Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 
the courts completely dismissed the plaintiffs’ nuisance complaints.274 
These unsuccessful plaintiffs merely pled general statements about the 
dangerous substances used in fracing, and made conclusory statements 
concerning the migration of those substances.275 The complaints con-
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tained no specific facts about the chemicals, water contamination lev-
els, or costs of procuring alternative water.276 
 A successful nuisance complaint will therefore list specific chemi-
cals that the defendant uses during fracing activity, connect those 
chemicals with contaminants found in their drinking water supply, pro-
cure comparative water or soil samples from before and after the start 
of fracing activity, allege both intentional and unintentional invasion, 
and show that the parties have incurred costs for water replacement, 
testing, and healthcare.277 A prima facie case for nuisance does not re-
quire specific causation such as defective casing, or intersections of old 
and new wells, but general conclusory allegations will not suffice.278 
 By following a few simple guidelines, citizens can prepare for a nui-
sance case against fracing operators without incurring the exorbitant 
research costs normally associated with environmental cases.279 Potential 
plaintiffs living near a fracing site or a future fracing site can begin mon-
itoring and saving samples of their drinking water immediately.280 Plain-
tiffs concerned about the ecosystem and the environmental integrity of 
their property should collect soil and water samples from ponds or 
streams that run through their property, even before any harmful effects 
are noticed.281 
Conclusion 
 Environmentalists and citizens face rough legal terrain when chal-
lenging hydraulic fracturing activity. Federal and state regulation pro-
vides little help, while the common law remains largely undeveloped 
due to the high incidence of settlement. Recent cases, however, have 
shown that nuisance provides plaintiffs with recourse for responding to 
groundwater contamination caused by fracing. Furthermore, courts 
have demonstrated a tendency to recognize that subterranean activities 
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that cause invasions of property interests deserve a less stringent stand-
ard when it comes to proving causation and substantial harm. Although 
proper regulation, either nationally or state by state, would be the most 
effective way to monitor fracing activity, the common law nuisance doc-
trine promises to provide communities and citizens with some measure 
of assurance that their property interests will be protected. 
